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Quite often, the market value of a firm in parts exceeds its value as a single entity.  The 
maximum value can be attained in such instances, by splitting the firm up.  We observe several 
instances where a firm’s management breaks up the firm to achieve maximum value.  In other 
cases, firms require a change in management to initiate divestiture. Lastly, takeover by outsiders 
is sometimes required to split the firm up and sell it in parts to achieve full value.  This study 
provides an economic analysis of the payoffs to all parties involved in a corporate breakup.  
Models of the costs and benefits to shareholders and management teams are developed for each 






uite often, the market value of a firm in parts exceeds its value as a single entity.  In such instances, 
shareholders can realize the maximum value of their investment if the company‟s managers break the 
firm up.  Yet we observe several instances where firms are taken over by outsiders and subsequently 
split up and sold in parts by the new owners.  Following some acquisitions, acquirers are required to sell parts of 
these firms because of anti-trust issues.  The practice is common in regulated industries such as banking, energy, 
and utilities, where acquirers may be required to divest portions of the acquired firm or withdraw from certain 
segments of the market by getting rid of some assets.  Among the several examples are the Federal Trade 
Commission approval of the acquisition of Gulf Oil Corp by Chevron in 1984, the Federal Reserve approval of First 
Union acquisition of Corestates Financial Corp in 1998, the Federal Communications Commission approval of GTE 
Corp merger with Bell Atlantic in 1999, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approval American 
Electric Power Co. acquisition of Central & South West in 2000.  In each case the new entity had to dispose of 
assets as a condition of the approval granted by the regulatory agency.  However, in many cases, the only apparent 
reason for the takeover and subsequent split-up is for value extraction.  The cases of outsiders acquiring firms and 
splitting them up for value extraction raises the question of why the incumbent management team did not divest the 
firm themselves with the original shareholders receiving the extracted value.  To answer this question we examine 
the costs associated with divestiture. 
 
We review the cost structures of three different situations: an incumbent management team splitting up the 
firm, an incumbent management team refusing to split the firm up is replaced by a management team that will 
divest and divestiture by outsiders after a takeover.  Developing the theoretical basis for the costs in these different 
cases provides the basis for a study of the market and governance frictions that inhibit divestiture by incumbent 
management when the value of a firm is greater in parts than it is as a single entity. 
 
THEORY AND MODEL 
 
The theoretical basis for this analysis focuses on the value-maximizing objective of the firms‟ managers.  
Managers are expected to pursue the course of action that results in the maximum value of the firm.  Consequently, 
when a firm is of greater value in parts than it is as a single entity, value-maximizing managers should split the firm 
up.  There are, in fact, many instances when incumbent managers undertake divestitures voluntarily.  However, we 
also observe situations where a firm is taken over by outsiders only to be split into parts and sold.  The third 
possibility requires that the management team be removed and replaced by a new team that splits the firm up. 
Q 




Consider a firm with the current market value as a single entity denoted by mV  and its true value in parts 
denoted by tV , with 0VV mt  .  The firm‟s managers, as insiders, have access to private and proprietary 
information that is not available to outsiders.  Therefore, incumbent managers have a better estimate of the true 
value of the firm than do outsiders.  Outsiders must incur costs to secure the information required to estimate the 
value of the firm.  Not only do outsiders incur costs not applicable to incumbent managers, but also the information 
they gather is likely to be less accurate than the information possessed by incumbent managers.  The costs incurred 
by outsiders for gathering and processing information about the firm is denoted by c .  All that matters for the 
purpose of this paper, however, is that it is more costly for outsiders to determine the value of the firm.  Outsiders 
will take over a firm, split it up and sell the parts only when it is profitable for them to do so, that is, their profit 
from the transaction ( O ) is greater than zero.  Therefore, the true value of the firm (in parts) must exceed the 
market value of the firm as a single entity by some minimum amount before it becomes profitable for outsiders to 
invest the resources necessary to determine the value of the firm, and then initiate a takeover. 
 
Incumbent Manager Divestiture 
 
To arrive at an estimate of the true value of a firm tV , let us assume that incumbent managers incur no 
costs beyond those, which are included as part of the firm‟s operating expenses.  Therefore, these expenses are 
already accounted for in the observed market value of the firm.  Consequently, value-maximizing managers carry 
out a divestiture when the true value of the firm in parts exceeds the market value of the firm as a single entity.  
Incumbent managers may choose to do carve out, a spin-off or a sell-off.  In a comparison of spin-offs and sell-offs, 
Steiner (1997) finds that incumbent managers tend to do a sell-off when the parent is unprofitable, has a high level 
of long-term debt, and managers own less of the equity.  The amount by which the value of the firm in parts ( tV ) 
exceeds the value of the firm as a single entity is defined as the divestiture premium, denoted by IW .  The divestiture 
premium is represented as 0VVW mtI  .  In other words, we should expect incumbent managers to undertake a 
divestiture when the divestiture premium earned by current shareholders is positive.  On the other hand, it is only 
economical for outsiders to take over a firm and split it up when the difference between their estimated value of the 
firm in parts and the value of the firm as a single entity is substantially greater than zero.  The difference must be 
sufficiently large to cover information costs and provide a return to the outsiders that is commensurate with the risk 
of takeover.  We define as a split-up premium, denoted by OW , the amount by which the value of the firm in parts 
as estimated by outsiders exceeds the amount paid by outsiders who take the firm over and then sell it off in parts.  
It is presumed that outsiders always pay a takeover premium, denoted by p , to existing shareholders to gain control 
of the firm.  Therefore, the split-up premium must be sufficiently large to cover the information gathering and 
processing costs, and provide a suitable return for the outsiders who take the firm over.  The takeover premium paid 
to existing shareholders must be sufficiently large to entice them to tender the minimum number of shares required 
to facilitate the takeover.  The takeover premium must be greater than some minimum value, whereby the number 
of shares tendered will be large enough to facilitate a successful takeover.  The necessary condition for a successful 
outsider-initiated takeover is that the split-up premium exceeds the information costs, that is, OW  must be greater 
than c .  Here, we characterize as successful, a takeover that is profitable for the outsiders who take over the firm 
and split it up. 
 
On the contrary some takeovers may turn out to be unprofitable for the outsiders.  This occurs when 
outsiders make an incorrect estimate of the value of the firm in parts ( tV ), and therefore, pay too much for the firm, 
akin to the hubris hypothesis presented by Roll (1986) and Shleifer & Vishny (1989).  These bad acquisitions also 
appear to result in subsequent divestitures as reported by Mitchell & Lehn (1990), who found that acquisitions that 
were subsequently divested were the ones unfavorably received by investors.  Outsiders overpay when the split-up 
premium is not sufficiently large to cover the costs of gathering and processing information.  In addition to the cases 
where outsiders incorrectly estimate tV , overpayment may also result from outsiders paying an excessive takeover 
premium to gain control of the firm.  For these „hubristic‟ takeovers, the split-up premium turns out to be less than 
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the information costs, cWO  .  Even when cWO  , the net profits O  must still reach some minimum level before 
these takeovers become viable. 
 
However, we focus on those instances where outsiders do not overpay.  Only in these cases, with cWO  , is 
it possible for outsiders to take over the firm and profitably split it up into parts.  These divestitures are considered 
to be successful.  However other studies (Bergh; 1997; Porter, 1987) characterize acquisitions that are subsequently 
divested as failures.  Consistent with our conjecture, Kaplan & Weisbach (1992) analysis of 271 acquisitions 
between 1971 and 1992 suggest that many divested acquisitions were not failures.  Focusing on these successful 
acquisitions, let us assume outsiders make an accurate estimate of the value of the firm in parts or at least their 
estimate is sufficiently accurate so that cWO  .  In such instances the outsiders receive the value of the firm in parts 
and pays out the market value plus the takeover premium, so that: 
 
    cpWpVVpVVW ImtmtO                                                                                                              
(1) 
 
With c being a positive number, equation (1) implies that pWI  .  Therefore, in all instances where 
outsiders profitably take over and split up the firm, current shareholders would be better off if incumbent managers 
undertake a divestiture, since their net gain IW  is greater than the takeover premium they receive from the outsiders.  
This result implies that existing shareholders lose in all instances where outsiders take over a firm and profitably 
split it up and sell it in parts. 
 
Replacement Manager Divestiture 
 
When the circumstances are such that the divestiture premium is positive ( 0WI  ) and the current 
managers do not undertake a divestiture, shareholders may also realize the true value of their investment by 
replacing incumbent managers with new managers who split up the firm and realize its maximum value.  To the 
extent incumbent managers are not replaced may be an indication that the cost of replacing the incumbent managers 
is prohibitive (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989).  The cost incurred by current shareholders to replace incumbent managers 
with new managers who will initiate the divestiture is denoted by 0g  .  The cost of replacing incumbent managers 
is excessive when IWg  .  In other words, it costs shareholders more to replace the managers than they gain from 
the divestiture. 
 
If incumbent managers maximize the market value of the firm, shareholders receive tV , with a net gain of 
IW .  However, if new managers must be hired to realize the maximum value of the firm, shareholders would 
receive a net gain of: 
 
      IImtmt WgWgVVVgV                                                                                                                   
(2) 
 
The existing the shareholders‟ net gain is now reduced by the cost of replacing the incumbent managers.  
This indicates that incumbent manager divestitures are always more favorable to the shareholders than do 
replacement manager divestitures. 
 
Outside Manager Divestiture 
 
When incumbent managers do not undertake a divestiture, and shareholders fail to hire new managers, outsiders 
must take over the firm in order to realize its maximum value.  In those circumstances, incumbent shareholders 
receive the existing market value plus the takeover premium paid by the outsiders.  This is less than the amount 
current shareholders receive either when incumbent managers make the decision to divest or shareholders replace 
the incumbent managers with new managers who then undertake the divestiture.  Recall that existing shareholders 
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receive the gain from divestiture, which is equal to  mt VV   when incumbent managers spit up the firm and equal 
to   gVV mt   when new managers are hired to undertake the divestiture.  When incumbent managers do not 
undertake a divestiture, wealth-maximizing shareholders are faced with two choices; they either hire new managers 
or sell the firm to outsiders.  Shareholders would not replace the incumbent managers when the costs are 
prohibitive, that is, when IWg  .  Furthermore, even when the costs are not prohibitive, it may still be irrational to 
hire new managers to undertake the divestiture.  Such is the case when the net gain from a divesture undertaken by 
the new managers is less than the takeover premium that could be obtained from outsiders ( pgWI  ).  
Consequently, we should not observe situations where shareholders hire new managers and receive a net 
payout  gVt  , which is less than the payment they could receive by selling the firm to outsiders for  pVm  .  
Therefore,  gVt  -  pVm   is always positive. 
 
The proceeds to existing shareholders under the three scenarios would therefore satisfy the following 
condition: 
 
   pVgVV mtt                                                                                                                                                  
(3) 
 
Subtracting the existing market value of the firm as a single entity from the payout to the existing shareholders 
in each case yields the net gain from divestiture under the three scenarios.  The net gain received by existing 
shareholders is mt VV   when incumbent managers undertake the divestiture.  The net gain to existing shareholders 
when new managers are hired to divest is mt VgV   and mm VpV   when the firm is taken over by outsiders.  
Using the relationship in Equation 3 yields: 
 
   mmmtmt VpVVgVVV  , which implies that pgWW II  . 
 
This suggests that existing shareholders also fare better when they replace incumbent managers rather than 
wait for the point where it becomes economical for outsiders to acquire the firm. 
 
The implication is that the full incremental value from splitting up the firm goes to the current shareholders 
if incumbent managers split up the firm.  If new managers are hired to do the split-up, the shareholders‟ portion of 
the incremental value is reduced by the cost incurred by the shareholders to replace existing managers with new 
managers.  If the firm is taken over the shareholders receive a net gain equal only to the takeover premium and the 
new owners of the firm keep the residual ( v ).  The outsiders‟ gain from the divestiture is equal to 0cv  , since 
they must at least cover the costs of gathering and processing information. 
 
  cvpWpVV Imt                                                                                                                                         
(4) 
 




Like post-acquisition sell-offs, incumbent manager-initiated divestitures generate cash when these 
managers divest to realize the true value of firms.  Both the acquisition and sell-off by outsiders and divestitures by 
incumbent managers achieve the same objective of maximizing the value of the firm when its value in parts is 
greater than that of the single entity.  The difference in the outcome is that existing shareholders receive a greater 
benefit when the value-maximizing decision to split up the firm is initiated by incumbent managers, as opposed to 
new managers or outsider acquirers. 
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Our theory suggests that it is always more profitable to existing shareholders to split up the firm when the 
value in parts exceeds the value of the firm as a single entity.  The question therefore arises: Why do some firms 
require a takeover or management replacement to initiate a divestiture?  We posit that there are frictions in the 
market or the governance structures of these firms that inhibit them from realizing their true value.  Governance 
mechanisms such as ownership structure and ownership concentration are possible factors.  Other characteristics of 
the firm such as CEO compensation, the structure of CEO compensation, as well as the firm‟s investment 
opportunities may cause incumbent management to resist divestiture to the point where replacement or takeover is 
necessary.  Nixon, Rosenfeldt & Sicherman (2000) analysis of 128 divestitures between 1988 and 1993 finds 
evidence that internal control mechanisms influence the choice of method incumbent managers use to do a 
divestiture.  The potent theoretical argument we have presented is profuse with ideas that raise interesting empirical 
questions.  An examination of the governance mechanisms we have identified and that have been associated with 
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